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A well-known result in incentive theory is that for a very broad
class of decision problems, there is no mechanism which achieves truth-
telling in dominant strategies, eﬃciency and budget balancedness (or
ﬁrst best implementability). On the contrary, Mitra and Sen (1998),
prove that linear cost queueing models are ﬁrst best implementable.
This paper is an attempt at identiﬁcation of cost structures for which
queueing models are ﬁrst best implementable. The broad conclusion is
that, this is a fairly large class. Some of these ﬁrst best implementable
models can be implemented by mechanisms that satisfy individually
rationality.1 Introductions
There is a vast literature on incentive theory under incomplete informa-
tion suggesting that under quasi-linear preferences the achievement of truth-
telling and eﬃciency is possible. The pioneering work of Groves (1973) and
Clarke (1971) has established that there exists a class of mechanisms, the so
called Groves mechanisms where all individuals have a dominant strategy to
reveal their information. Moreover, the truth-telling outcome leads to eﬃ-
ciency1. However, Groves mechanisms are in general not balanced i.e there
are preference realizations where aggregate transfers are non-zero. The bud-
get imbalance of Groves mechanisms’ in the context of public goods problem
is shown in Green and Laﬀont (1977)2.
This paper develops and reﬁnes a line of research initiated by Mitra and
Sen (1998). They show that there exists a class of “public decision problems”
which are dominant strategy incentive compatible, eﬃcient and balanced.
One of the best examples of such a public decision problem is the queueing
model which is the model we are concerned with. In this queueing model
there is a server who has to serve a ﬁnite set of individuals. The server can
serve one individual at a time. Thus, individuals have to wait in a queue.
Waiting in a queue is costly for each individual. The server’s objective is to
order the individuals in a queue eﬃciently so as to minimise the aggregate
waiting cost. If the cost of waiting in the queue is private information then
an individual, if asked, will announce his costs strategically so as to get his
job done as early as possible. Therefore, the principal in the queueing model
has an incentive problem under incomplete information. A model similar to
the queueing model is the sequencing model in Suijs (1996).
Mitra and Sen (1998) demonstrate that if waiting costs are linear, it is
possible to devise a scheme of balanced transfers that induce individuals to
1Eﬃciency means that the outcome achieved in each state is the one that maximises
the social surplus.
2See Green and Laﬀont (1979) for a comprehensive account of these mechanisms and
their properties.
1reveal their private information and attain eﬃciency. Suijs (1996) proves a
similar result in the context of his model. It is important to identify the
reason why a possibility result holds in this model in contrast to the well-
known impossibility result in the case of the public good model. In the latter
model, an individual who, by changing his announcement, aﬀects the payoﬀ
all individuals. It is this severe nature of this externality that leads to
budget imbalance (see Green and Laﬀont (1979)). In the queueing model
with linear cost the externality that can be imposed by an individual is less
severe and more subtle. An individual with kth queue position by changing
his announcement can aﬀect the decision of either individuals who precede
him in the queue or those who succeed him. He cannot simultaneously aﬀect
the decisions of both the predecessor and the successor sets. Thus only
the individuals getting the ﬁrst position and last position in the queue can
aﬀect all other individuals by changing their announcements. This sort of
externality is necessary for ﬁnding a Groves transfer where the individuals
served earlier compensates for those served later in such a way that aggregate
transfer is zero in all states.
Another important feature of any queueing model is that the incentive
problem is “spread over” the queue positions and this helps in ﬁnding a bal-
anced Groves transfer where the individuals being served “earlier” pay money
to the individuals receiving “late” service. For example, with three individ-
uals, a balanced Groves transfer in the queueing model is of the following
type. The individual receiving the service ﬁrst pays the waiting cost of the
individual who is served second in the queue and this money goes to the
individual who is served last. The ﬁrst part of the transfer resembles that of
the transfer in second price auction where the highest bidder pays the second
highest bid (see Vickrey (1961)). However, in the second price auction this
money goes to an outsider like the principal. In the queueing model there
is an incentive problem for all queue positions and so the payment of the
second highest cost to the individual in the third queue position more then
compensates him for the loss of getting the third queue position instead of
2the second queue position (see Mitra and Sen (1998)).
We attempt to answer the following question: are there cost structures
more general than the linear case where the “ﬁrst best” can be attained? We
prove that for ﬁrst best implementability it is both necessary and suﬃcient
that preferences satisfy a certain combinatorial property and an independence
property. The ﬁrst property is a restriction on individual preferences while
the second property is a restriction on the externality that an individual
can impose on the remaining set of individuals. We need a combinatorial
structure over the cost vector of each individual which is captured by the
combinatorial property. Preferences satisfy the independence property if an
individual, by changing his announcement, cannot change the relative queue
positions of the remaining set of individuals. For instance, if there are n
individuals then the relative queue positions of any set of (n−1) individuals
are independent of the queue position of the individual who is left out. In
spite of these requirements, apparently quite strong, there exists a fairly large
class of queueing problems that are ﬁrst best implementable. Given a broad
class of ﬁrst best implementable queueing models one can then explore the
possibility of individual rationality i.e. whether individuals would be willing
to participate in the mechanism oﬀered by the server. It can be shown that if
the gross beneﬁt from the service for all individuals is suﬃciently high, then
ﬁrst best implementable queueing models satisfy individual rationality.
This paper is organised as follows. In section two, the general queueing
model is formalised and results on its ﬁrst best implementability are derived.
Section three deals with separable cost queueing models and its applications.
Section four formalises a general class of ﬁrst best implementable queueing
problem. Section ﬁve is a discussion of discounted cost queueing model. The
concluding section seven is preceded by an exploration of the possibility of
individual rationality of ﬁrst best queueing models in section six.
32 The General Model
Let N = {1,2,...,n} be the set of individuals and θj(k) measure the cost
of waiting k periods in the queue for individual j where k ∈ {1,...,n}.
The type of individual j ∈ N is the vector θj = (θj(1),...,θj(n)). Clearly,
θj(k) ∈ R+ for all j ∈ N and for all k ∈ {1,...,n}3. It is assumed that all
individuals dislike waiting i.e. 0 ≤ θj(1) ≤ θj(2) ≤ ... ≤ θj(n). Let ¯ Θ be the
largest domain satisfying this condition. For all j ∈ N, θj ∈ ¯ Θ, the utility of
each individual j is assumed to be quasi-linear and is of the form:
Uj(k,tj;θj) = vj − θj(k) + tj
where vj(> 0) is the gross beneﬁt derived by individual j from the service
and tj is the transfer that individual j receives.
The server’s aim is to achieve eﬃciency or minimise the aggregate cost.
A permutation σ = (σ1,...,σn) of the set N represents a particular queue.
Thus, σj = k indicates that individual j has the kth position in the queue.
Let Σ be the set of all possible permutations of N. Given a permutation or
a queue σ = (σ1,...,σn)(∈ Σ), the cost of any individual j ∈ N is θj(σj). A
state of the world is θ = (θ1,...,θn) ∈ ¯ Θn where θj is a 1 × n vector.
DEFINITION 2.1 Given a state θ, a queue σ∗ = (σ∗
1,...,σ∗
n) is eﬃcient




Eﬃciency in this context is an assignment problem that gives each in-
dividual exactly one queue position and each queue position to exactly one
individual in such a way that the aggregate cost is minimised5.
If the server knows θ = (θ1,...,θn) then he can calculate the eﬃcient
queue. However, if θj is private information for individual j, the server’s
3R+ represents the non-negative orthant of R.
4Observe that there can be states with more than one eﬃcient queue. So we have an
eﬃciency correspondence.
5This is a subtle optimization problem. An algorithm which computes eﬃciency is the
Hungarian method which can be found in Bapat and Raghavan (1997).
4problem then is to design a mechanism that will elicit this information
truthfully. Formally, a mechanism M is a pair hσ,ti where σ : ¯ Θn → Σ and
t ≡ (t1,...,tn) : ¯ Θn → Rn. This problem is called a general queueing
problem under incomplete information and is written as Ω = hN, ¯ Θi. Under
M = hσ,ti, given all others’ announcement θ−j, the utility of individual j of
type θj when his announcement is θj
0 is given by
Uj(σj(θj
0,θ−j),tj(θj
0,θ−j),θj) = vj − θj(σj(θj
0,θ−j)) + tj(θj
0,θ−j).
DEFINITION 2.2 Ω = hN, ¯ Θi is implementable if there exists an ef-
ﬁcient rule6 σ∗ : ¯ Θn → Σ and a mechanism M = hσ∗,ti such that for all
j ∈ N, for all (θj,θj








This deﬁnition says that for any given θ−j, individual j cannot beneﬁt by
reporting anything other than his true type. In other words, truth-telling is
a dominant strategy for all individuals. Moreover, this truth-telling leads to
eﬃcient queue.
DEFINITION 2.3 Ω = hN, ¯ Θi is ﬁrst best implementable or FB im-
plementable, if there exists a mechanism M = hσ∗,ti which implements it




Thus, a queueing problem is ﬁrst-best implementable if, it can be imple-
mented in a manner such that aggregate transfers are zero in every state of
the world. In such problems, incomplete information does not impose any
welfare cost. In the next section the question of FB implementability of the
general queueing model is analysed.
2.1 Characterization Results
In this sub-section the necessary and suﬃcient conditions relating to the FB
implementability of the general queueing model are derived. As a preliminary
6An eﬃcient rule is a single valued selection from the eﬃciency correspondence.
5step to the main result, some more deﬁnitions and notations are introduced
that will be extensively used in this section.
DEFINITION 2.4 A mechanism M = hσ,ti is a Groves mechanism if for






l (θ)) + γj(θ−j) (2.1)
In a Groves mechanism, the transfer of any individual j ∈ N in any
state θ is the negative of minimum cost i.e. −
P
l∈N θl(σ∗
l (θ)) plus the cost
of individual j and a constant γj(θ−j). The utility of individual j with a
Groves transfer is his gross beneﬁt vj less the minimum cost in state θ plus
the constant. It is well known that such a transfer results in dominant
strategy incentive compatibility because the servers’ objective of minimising
the aggregate cost is now an objective of individual j as well and this is true
for all j ∈ N.
According to a well known result of Holmstr¨ om (see Holmstr¨ om (1979)),
decision problems with “smoothly connected” domains are implementable if
and only if the mechanism is a Groves mechanism. In more precise terms,
convex domains are “smoothly connected” (see Theorem (2) in Holmstr¨ om
(1979)). It can be easily checked that the domain under consideration in the
general queueing model satisfy Holmstr¨ om’s deﬁnition of “convex” domains.






j(θ0)) where, as stated earlier, σ∗(θ0) is an
eﬃcient queue for the announced state θ0. Thus, C(σ∗(θ0);θ) is the minimum
aggregate cost with respect to the announced state θ0 when the actual state
is θ. For notational simplicity deﬁne C(θ) ≡ C(σ∗(θ);θ) to be the minimum
aggregate cost with respect to the actual state θ when the announced state
is also θ.
REMARK 2.1 From the deﬁnition of eﬃciency it follows that for all θ and
θ0, C(θ) ≤ C(σ∗(θ0);θ).
6DEFINITION 2.5 Ω = hN, ¯ Θi satisﬁes the Combinatorial Property









θj(k) = 0 (2.2)
This property is a combinatorial condition on the domain of preferences.
The meaning of this property will become explicit from the following discus-
sion. For individual j with type θj = (θj(1),...,θj(n)) deﬁne the ﬁrst order
diﬀerence at queue position k ∈ {1,...,n−1} as ∆(1)θj(k) = θj(k+1)−θj(k).
Thus, the ﬁrst order diﬀerence at k represents the increase in queueing cost if
individual j is moved from kth position to (k + 1)th position. In particular,
the ﬁrst order diﬀerence at queue position 1 is ∆(1)θj(1) = θj(2) − θj(1).
Similarly, the second order diﬀerence at queue position 1 is ∆2(1)θj(1) =
∆(1)[∆(1)θj(1)] = ∆(1)[θj(2)−θj(1)] = θj(3)−2θj(2)+θj(1). One can sim-












Thus a type θj of individual j satisﬁes CP if the (n − 1)th order diﬀerence
at queue position 1 is zero. CP is analogous to (n − 1)th order derivative at
queue position 1. CP implies and is implied by some kind of separability to
be discussed later in Proposition 2.1.
To deﬁne the next property one needs to introduce some more notations
and deﬁnitions. Consider a queueing model Ω. Deﬁne, by eliminating l ∈ N,
the l-reduced queueing model of Ω to be ΩN−l = hN−l, ¯ Θi. In any state
θ−l ∈ Θn−1, let σ∗(θ−l) be the eﬃcient queue in ΩN−l. In other words,
σ




where Σ(N − l) is the set of all possible permutations of {1,...,n − 1} and
˜ σj is the position of individual j(6= l) in the particular queue ˜ σ ∈ Σ(N − l).
7In short, ΩN−l is a l-reduced queueing model of (n−1) individuals obtained
from Ω by excluding l ∈ N.
For Ω, deﬁne P(σ∗(θ),j) = {p ∈ N/{j} | σ∗
j(θ) > σ∗
p(θ)} to be the
predecessor set of individual j in state θ. In other words, under the eﬃcient
queue σ∗(θ) in state θ, P(σ∗(θ),j) is the set of individuals receiving the
service before individual j. Similarly, for ΩN−l, deﬁne P(σ∗(θ−l),j) = {p ∈
N/{j,l} | σ∗
j(θ−l) > σ∗
p(θ−l)} to be the predecessor set of individual j in state
θ−l. Under the eﬃcient queue σ∗(θ−l) in state θ−l, P(σ∗(θ−l),j) is the set of
individuals receiving the service before individual j.
DEFINITION 2.6 Ω satisﬁes Independence Property (or IP) if for all






P(σ∗(θ),j) if l 6∈ P(σ∗(θ),j)
P(σ∗(θ),j)/{l} if l ∈ P(σ∗(θ),j)
This property means that if in state θ, σ∗
j(θ) = k, then σ∗
j(θ−l) = k for
all l 6∈ P(σ∗(θ),j) and σ∗
j(θ−l) = k − 1 for all l ∈ P(σ∗(θ),j). Another
way of stating IP is the following: Consider Ω and a pair {j,l} ∈ N. If
σ∗
j(θ) < σ∗
l (θ) in state θ, then σ∗
j(θ−i) < σ∗
l (θ−i) for all i ∈ N/{j,l}. If this
condition holds for all pair of individuals and for all states in Ω then it is
easy to check that Ω satisﬁes IP. This condition says that if individual j’s
position in the queue is less than that of individual l in some state θ, then
j’s queue position must continue to remain less than that of l’s position in
all ΩN−i that includes both j and l. This condition must hold for all pair
{j,l} ∈ N and for all states θ ∈ ¯ Θn. IP eliminates the possibility that an
individual l ∈ N/{j}, who is a predecessor (successor) of individual j in
state θ is a successor (predecessor) of individual j in state θ−i for some i-
reduced queueing model ΩN−i where i ∈ N/{j,l}. Thus, IP guarantees that
the externality imposed by an individual (i in the above argument) is not
severe enough to change the relative queue position of the remaining set of
individuals.
8The separability implied by the combinatorial property and the link be-
tween the combinatorial property (or CP) and the independence property (or
IP) is captured by the following Proposition and the explanation following
it.
PROPOSITION 2.1 Ω = hN, ¯ Θi satisﬁes CP, if and only if for each θj ∈
¯ Θ there exists a unique vector Hj = {hj(1),...,hj(n − 1)} such that for all
k ∈ {1,...,n},
θj(k) = (n − k)hj(k) + (k − 1)hj(k − 1). (2.3)
PROOF: Given a n × 1 vector of type for individual j ∈ N, θj ∈ ¯ Θ in Ω
satisfying CP, we deﬁne a (n−1)×1 vector Hj = {hj(1),...,hj(n−1)} such





k−r(k − 1)!(n − k − 1)!
(r − 1)!(n − r)!
θj(r) (2.4)
First we check using (2.4) that for all k ∈ {1,...,n − 1}, (2.1) holds. Then
we check for k = n this condition holds only if Ω satisﬁes CP.
(n − k)hj(k) + (k − 1)hj(k − 1)















= θj(k) (because (−1)k−r + (−1)k−r−1 = 0).
For k = n,
(n − k)hj(k) + (k − 1)hj(k − 1)
= (n − 1)hj(n − 1)



















= θj(n) (from CP).
The last step not only proves the necessity of CP but also guarantees that
for θj, Hj is unique.
To prove the other part of the Lemma it is easy to see that if θj(k) =

















{(n − k)hj(k) + (k − 1)hj(k − 1)}


















Consider Ω and some state θ where individual j ∈ N gets the kth queue
position. Note that in state θ, out of the remaining (n − 1) individuals in
N/{j}, there are (n − k) individuals receiving the service after individual j
and there are (k − 1) individuals receiving the service before individual j.
Consider ΩN−l for all l ∈ N/{j}. Now if an individual l receiving the service
after individual j, i.e. l 6∈ P(σ∗(θ),j), were to be eliminated, then from IP
it follows that j retains the kth queue position in ΩN−l. If, on the other
hand, an individual l who was receiving the service before individual j, i.e.
l ∈ P(σ∗(θ),j), is eliminated from the queue then, from IP it follows that
the queue position of individual j changes from k in Ω to (k − 1) in ΩN−l.
If the vector Hj in Proposition 2.1 replaces θj for reduced queueing models
{ΩN−l}l6=j, the cost of kth queue position for individual j i.e. θj(k), in Ω
for state θ, can now be represented as the sum of costs in (n − 1) reduced
queueing models. Here individual j has cost hj(k) in (n − k) of the reduced
queueing models. These are reduced models ΩN−l such that l 6∈ P(σ∗(θ),j)
and total number of such reduced models is |N−[P(σ∗(θ),j)∪{j}]| = n−k.
Similarly, individual j has a cost of hj(k − 1) in (k − 1) of these models.
These are reduced models ΩN−l such that l ∈ P(σ∗(θ),j) and total number
10of such reduced models is |P(σ∗(θ),j)| = k − 1. Observe that this will give
θj(k) = (n−k)hj(k)+(k−1)hj(k−1) which follows from CP as established
in Proposition 2.1.
REMARK 2.2 Consider an individual j and a proﬁle θj ∈ ¯ Θ satisfying
CP. From Proposition 2.1 it follows that there exists a unique vector Hj such
that for all k ∈ {1,...,n}, θj(k) = (n − k)hj(k) + (k − 1)hj(k − 1). Using
θj(1) ≤ θj(2) ≤ ... ≤ θj(n) one obtains the following restriction on the
elements of Hj. hj(1) ≤ hj(r) ≤ hj(n − 1) for all r ∈ {2,...,n − 2}. One
cannot comment on the ordering of the set of elements belonging to the set
{hj(2),...,hj(n − 2)}.
REMARK 2.3 Consider Ω and {θj,θl} ∈ ¯ Θ2 such that θj(k+1)−θj(k) ≥
θl(k + 1) − θl(k) for all k ∈ {1,...,n}. Note that θj(k + 1) − θj(k) ≥
θl(k + 1) − θl(k) implies that if in some state individuals j and l are as-
signed queue positions k and k + 1, then it is more eﬃcient to serve in-
dividual j ahead of individual l because the marginal cost of shifting in-
dividual j from queue position k to queue position k + 1 is no less than
the same marginal cost for individual l. If this condition is true for all k
then σ∗
j(θj,θl,θ−j−l) < σ∗
l (θj,θl,θ−j−l) for all θ−j−l ∈ ¯ Θn−2. One obvious
implication of this observation is that σ∗
j(θj,θl,θ−j−l−i) < σ∗
l (θj,θl,θ−j−l−i)
for all i ∈ N/{j,l} and for all θ−j−l−i ∈ ¯ Θn−3. Another useful impli-
cation is the following. Consider a state θ where for all pairs {j,l}, if
θj(2) − θj(1) ≥ θl(2) − θl(1), then θj(k + 1) − θj(k) ≥ θl(k + 1) − θl(k)
for all k ∈ {2,...,n − 1}. In state θ, if for some pair {j,l}, σ∗
j(θ) < σ∗
l (θ)
then from the construction of state θ it follows that σ∗
j(θ−i) < σ∗
l (θ−i) for all
i ∈ N/{j,l}. Therefore, in state θ, Ω satisﬁes IP. This remark will be used
in some of the results to follow.
In the case of |N| = 3, it is possible to show that CP implies IP. Unfor-
tunately, for |N| > 3 this is no longer true.
PROPOSITION 2.2 Ω = hN = {1,2,3}, ¯ Θi satisﬁes CP ⇒ Ω satisﬁes IP.
11PROOF: Ω = hN = {1,2,3}, ¯ Θi satisﬁes CP implies that the second order
diﬀerence is zero. Thus ∆(1)θj(1) ≡ θj(2)−θj(1) = θj(3)−θj(2) ≡ ∆(1)θj(2)
for all j = 1,2,3. Therefore, for a pair of preferences {θj,θl} ∈ ¯ Θ2, if
θj(2)−θj(1) ≥ θl(2)−θl(1), then θj(3)−θj(2) ≥ θl(3)−θl(2). Using Remark
2.3 it immediately follows that Ω satisﬁes IP.
The next example is to show that for |N| > 3, there is no relationship
between CP and IP. Speciﬁcally, it shows that if Ω satisﬁes CP, it may not
satisfy IP.
EXAMPLE 2.1 Consider the general queueing model for four individuals,
i.e. Ω = hN = {1,2,3,4}, ¯ Θi. Let the state θ = (θ1,θ2,θ3,θ4) be of the
following form: θ1 = (1,23,45,67), θ2 = (3,12,27,48), θ3 = (1,4,9,16) and
θ4 = (1,7,13,19). Here, σ∗
j(θ) = j for all j = 1,2,3,4. We ﬁnd that state θ





























Now consider the {1}-reduced queueing model ΩN−1 = h{2,3,4}, ¯ Θi.
In this reduced model we consider the ﬁrst three elements of the vectors
θ2,θ3 and θ4. Here σ∗
2(θ−1) = 1, σ∗
3(θ−1) = 3 and σ∗
4(θ−1) = 2. Therefore,
P(σ∗(θ−1),3) = {2,4} 6= P(σ∗(θ),3)/{1} = {2} and P(σ∗(θ−1),4) = {2} 6=
P(σ∗(θ),4)/{1} = {2,3}. Thus for state θ, IP is violated.
THEOREM 2.1 Ω = hN, ¯ Θi is FB implementable if only if it satisﬁes
CP and IP.
Before proving the Theorem a Lemma due to Walker (1980) is stated
below. Consider two proﬁles θ = (θ1,...,θn) and θ0 = (θ0
1,...,θ0
n). Deﬁne
for S ⊆ N, a type θj(S) = θj if j 6∈ S and θj(S) = θ0
j if j ∈ S. Thus for each
S ⊆ N, we have a state θ(S) = (θ1(S),...,θn(S)).




12It is quite easy to see why Lemma 2.1 is necessary for FB implementabil-
ity. Given the Groves transfer, balancedness requires that (n − 1)C(θ) =
P
j∈N









(−1)|S|γj(θ−j(S)) = 0. It is quite clear
that if the function C has a separable form , then it must satisfy an appro-
priate restriction on the nth order cross partial derivative. The condition in
the Lemma is analogous of this derivative for ﬁnite changes.
PROOF OF THEOREM(2.1):
Necessity: We prove the necessity part of the Theorem in two steps. In
the ﬁrst step we prove that Ω is FB implementable only if it satisﬁes CP. In
the second step we prove that Ω satisfying CP is FB implementable only if
it satisﬁes IP.
Step 1: We start with a given type for individual 1 (i.e. θ1) and con-
struct θ−1 and θ0. Then we apply Lemma 2.1 to derive the result. Consider
individual 1 and any announcement θ1 = (θ1(1),...,θ1(k),...,θn(n)). De-
ﬁne real numbers {1,2,...,n,θ} such that 0 = 1 < 2 < ... < n and
0 ≤ θ ≤ θ1(1). Consider two states θ = (θ1,...,θn) and θ0 = (θ0
1,...,θ0
n)
of the following type: θj(k) = θ1(k) + kj and θ0
j(k) = θ, for all j ∈ N and
for all k = 1,...,n. Therefore θj = (θ1(1) + j,θ1(2) + j,...,θ1(n) + nj)
and θ0
j = (θ,θ,...,θ) for all j ∈ N. Consider any two queue positions k
and k + 1 and any two individuals j and j + 1 with types θj and θj+1,
respectively. Note that from the construction of θ, on the one hand, it
follows that if individual j gets the kth position and (j + 1)th individual
gets the (k + 1)th position, then the costs for these two positions add up to
{2θ1(k)+kj+(k+1)j+1}. If, on the other hand, the positions of j and (j+1)
are interchanged then the costs add up to {2θ1(k)+(k+1)j+kj+1}. Clearly
the former cost exceeds the latter 8 and holds for all k = 1,...,n − 1. Thus
the queue that minimises the aggregate cost requires that, σ∗
j(θ) > σ∗
j+1(θ)
7Adding the Groves transfer of all individuals and setting it to zero gives this condition.
This condition in a more general framework was derived by Holmstr¨ om (1977).
8This is because from the construction it follows that j+1 > j for all j = 1,...n − 1.
13for all j = 1,...,n − 1. This implies that the eﬃcient queue in state θ is
σ∗(θ) = (σ∗
1(θ) = n,...,σ∗
j(θ) = n − j + 1,...,σ∗
n(θ) = 1). In state θ0 any
queue is eﬃcient because the costs of all individuals are identical.
Now consider proﬁles θ(S) = (θ1(S),...,θn(S)) where θj(S) = θj if j 6∈ S
and θj(S) = θ0
j if j ∈ S. For all s ∈ S, the eﬃcient queue position is
behind all j 6∈ S, i.e. σ∗
s(θ(S)) ∈ {n − |S| + 1,...,n}. This is because the
queueing costs of all individuals j 6∈ S, in all queue positions strictly exceed
the queueing costs of all individual s ∈ S. Moreover, given θ1, from the
construction of θ−1 and from the argument given for the eﬃcient queue in






(−1)|S|C(θ(S)). Observe ﬁrst that, for all l ∈
N/{1} with type θl, if there exists m sets T 1,...,T m of size |T 1|,...,|T m|
respectively with T ˆ m ⊆ N/{l} for all ˆ m = 1,...,m, for which individual
l’s position is k(∈ {1,2,...,n}), then
m P
ˆ m=1




(−1)|S|C(θ(S)) is independent of all elements in the set of vectors
























For individual 1 with type θ1, σ∗










































An application of Lemma 2.1 yields the result for individual 1. We can obtain
the same result for all j ∈ N/{1}.
Step 2: For |N| = 3, Ω satisfying CP is FB implementable only if it satisﬁes
IP follows from Proposition 2.2. For Ω with |N| > 3, consider any two cost
vectors θ1 = (θ1(1),...,θ1(n)) and θ2 = (θ2(1),...,θ2(n)) for individuals 1
and 2 respectively. Let z = max[max{∆(1)θ1(k)}k6=n,max{∆(1)θ2(k)}k6=n].
Consider the real numbers {3,...,n,θ} such that z < 3 < ... < n and
θ ∈ [0,min{θ1(1),θ2(1)}]. Deﬁne θj(k) = kj for all k ∈ {1,...,n} and for all
j ∈ {3,...,n}. Also deﬁne θ0
j(k) = θ for all j ∈ N and for all k ∈ {1,...,n}.
From the construction it follows that ∆(1)θj(k) > max{∆(1)θ1,∆(1)θ2(k)}
for all j ∈ N/{1,2}. Now consider proﬁles θ(S) = (θ1(S),...,θn(S)) where
θj(S) = θj if j 6∈ S and θj(S) = θ0
j if j ∈ S. For all s ∈ S, the eﬃcient
queue position is behind all j 6∈ S, i.e. σ∗
s(θ(S)) ∈ {n − |S| + 1,...,n}.
This is because the queueing costs of all individuals j 6∈ S, in all queue
positions strictly exceed the queueing costs of all individual s ∈ S. From the
construction of {θ3,...,θn} it follows that for all {j,l} ∈ N/{1,2} and for all
S ∈ N/{j,l}, with j < l, σ∗
j(θj,θl,θ−j−l(S)) > σ∗
l (θj,θl,θ−j−l(S)). Observe
that for all S ∈ N/{1,2}, individuals 1 and 2 are immediate neighbours with
any one of 1 and 2 having queue position n−|S| and the other having queue




on the other hand, θ1(n−|S|−1)+θ2(n−|S|) ≥ θ1(n−|S|)+θ2(n−|S|−1) then
σ∗
1(θ1,θ2,θ−1−2(S)) > σ∗
2(θ1,θ2,θ−1−2(S)). Deﬁne, Z(k,k+1) = min{θ1(k)+
θ2(k+1),θ1(k+1)+θ2(k)} for all k ∈ {1,...n−1}. Making use of the above














For Ω to be FB implementable it is necessary from Lemma 2.1 that the RHS
of equation (2.5) is zero for all {θ1,θ2} ∈ ¯ Θ2 and satisfying CP. This crucially
15depends on the terms with Z(k,k+1) in the RHS of equation (2.5). We claim
that the RHS of (2.5) is zero if and only if either one of the two following
conditions is satisﬁed then Ω is FB implementable.
1. Z(k,k + 1) = θ1(k) + θ2(k + 1) for all k ∈ {1,...,n − 1}
2. Z(k,k + 1) = θ1(k + 1) + θ2(k) for all k ∈ {1,...,n − 1}.
We ﬁrst prove the if part of this claim. If condition (1) holds i.e. Z(k,k+1) =






























To prove the only if part of this claim we ﬁrst assume that the claim is
not true. This implies that there exists θ1 and θ2 for individuals 1 and 2 such
that
(i) ∆(1)θ1(1) ≥ ∆(1)θ2(1),
(ii) ∃ a set T ⊂ {2,3,...,n − 1} such that ∆(1)θ1(r) < ∆(1)θ2(r) for all
r ∈ T and
(iii) ∃ p ∈ {1,...,n − 1}/T such that ∆(1)θ1(p) > ∆(1)θ2(p).


























{θj(k + 1) − θj(k)} = 0.
16From Lemma 2.1 we know that for FB implementability we need that the
RHS of (2.6) must be zero. Now if ∆(1)θ2(k) = a > 0 for all k ∈ {1,...,n−
1} then construct a proﬁle ˆ θ1 such that ∆(1)ˆ θ1(k) = (2k + 1)b with b ∈
( a
2n−3, a
2n−1). Applying the same type of construction i.e. (2n + 1)b < 3 <
... < n and θ ∈ [0,min{ˆ θ1,θ2}] and deﬁning θj for all j ∈ {3,...,n} and θ0
j




|S|C(θ(S)) = ∆(1)θ2(n − 1) − ∆(1)ˆ θ1(n − 1) = a − (2n − 1)b 6= 0.
If ∆(1)θ2(k) is not a constant for all k 6= n, then consider ¯ θ2 such that
¯ θ2(k) = θ2(k) for all k ∈ {1,...,n−2} and select {¯ θ2(n−1), ¯ θ2(n)} in such a
way that ¯ a = ∆(1)¯ θ2(n − 1) > max{∆(1)¯ θ2(k)}k6=n−1. Again, deﬁne ¯ θ1 such
that ¯ θ1(k) = k1 where max{∆(1)¯ θ2(k)}k6=n−1 < 1 < ¯ a. Again by applying




|S|C(θ(S)) = ∆(1)¯ θ2(n − 1) − ∆(1)¯ θ1(n − 1) = ¯ a − 1 6= 0.
Therefore, for a preference satisfying condition (i) − (iii) and Lemma 2.1,
we can ﬁnd a preference in its neighbourhood that fails to satisfy Lemma
2.1. Thus, Ω satisfying CP is FB implementable only if either (1) holds
or condition (2) holds. Since the selection of individuals 1 and 2 for the
above construction was arbitrary, it follows that Ω satisfying CP is FB im-
plementable only if for all j 6= l,
either (a) θj(k + 1) − θj(k) ≥ θl(k + 1) − θl(k) for all k 6= n
or (b) θj(k + 1) − θj(k) ≤ θl(k + 1) − θl(k) for all k 6= n.
This condition means that the descending order of {θj(2) − θj(1)}n
j=1 deter-
mines the eﬃcient queue i.e. if θj(2) − θj(1) ≥ θl(2) − θl(1) in some state θ,
then σ∗
j(θ) < σ∗
l (θ). Using Remark 2.3 we get Ω satisﬁes IP. The logic is quite
simple, if for example, θj,θl are such that θj(k+1)−θj(k) ≥ θl(k+1)−θl(k)
for all k ∈ {1,...,n − 1}, then individual j is served ahead of individual l
for all eliminations of i ∈ N/{j,l}. This proves Step 2.




j(θ−l)) in state θ for individual j ∈ N.











j(θ)) (from condition (2.3) in Proposition 2.1).





























= (n − 1)C(θ).
This implies that for all θ ∈ ˆ Θn,
P
j∈N
ˆ tj(θ) = −(n−1)C(θ)+
P
j∈N
ˆ γj(θ−j) = 0.
This section dealt with the restrictions required for FB implementability
of the general queueing model. The next few sections restrict the cost of each
individual to have a common functional form.
3 Separable Cost Models
In this section a class of queueing models, called separable cost queueing
models, are considered. For separable cost queueing models, θj(k) satisﬁes
the following conditions:
1. θj(k) = f(k)g(θj) for all j ∈ N, for all k ∈ {1,2,...,n} and for all
θj ∈ Θ. Here Θ is assumed to be an interval in R+.
2. g(θj) > 0 for all θj ∈ Θ and g(θj) is continuous and strictly increasing
in θj.
3. Finally, f(k) ≥ f(k − 1) for all k ∈ {2,...,n}.
18The ﬁrst condition multiplicatively separates the cost of each individual
for each position into two functions. The ﬁrst function f depends on the
queue position. The second function g depends on the type (or cost parame-
ter i.e. θj) of an individual. The second condition is a restriction on the type
function. The third condition restricts the queueing cost function f to be
non-decreasing in queue positions. The second and third conditions together
imply that θj(k + 1) ≥ θj(k) for all k ∈ {1,...,n − 1}. The cost parameter
(i.e. θj for j ∈ N) is private information.
Each pair of functions (f,g) together with N and type space Θ, deﬁnes a
separable cost queueing problem ˆ Ω = hN,Θ,(f,g)i. A major beneﬁt of
such a speciﬁcation is that the eﬃciency condition is completely transparent
in this context. For a ˆ Ω, the queue σ∗(θ) ∈ Σ is eﬃcient in state θ if for
all j 6= l, θj > θl ⇒ σ∗
j(θ) < σ∗
l (θ). Ties can be broken in many ways.
A particular way of breaking ties, that will be followed in this paper, is to
consider the natural ordering i.e. if θj = θj and j < l then σ∗
j(θ) < σ∗
l (θ)10.
The next Proposition is related to IP of ˆ Ω.
PROPOSITION 3.3 ˆ Ω satisﬁes IP.
PROOF: Consider ˆ Ω = hN,Θ,(f,g)i and an individual j ∈ N with queue
position σ∗
j(θ) in state θ. If l ∈ P(σ∗(θ),j) then σ∗
j(θ−l) = σ∗
j(θ) − 1 and
P(σ∗(θ−l),j) = P(σ∗(θ),j)/{l} in ˆ ΩN−l = hN − l,Θ,(f,g)i. This is because
individual l is a predecessor of j in ˆ Ω = hN,Θ,(f,g)i. Also and because
according to the deﬁnition of eﬃciency and the same tie breaking rule as-
sumption, individual j’s queue position with respect to all other individuals
10Note that the deﬁnition of eﬃcient queue depends only on a pairwise comparison of
individual types. In other words, if θj > θl, then for all θ−j−l ∈ Θn−2, σ∗
j(θ) < σ∗
l (θ).
Also note that given the domain speciﬁcation, there are states for which more than one
ordering is eﬃcient. So we have an eﬃciency correspondence for all such states. The tie
breaking rule guarantees that in all states where more than one ordering is eﬃcient, the
decision picked is unique. Thus, a tie breaking rule guarantees a single valued selection of
ordering decision from the eﬃciency correspondence.
19N/{j,l} remains unchanged in ˆ ΩN−l = hN−l,Θ,(f,g)i. Recall that the def-
inition of eﬃciency for any separable cost queueing model ˆ Ω depends only on
the order of types of individuals. They remain invariant for the set of n − 1
individuals included in any ˆ ΩN−l = hN/{l},Θ,(f,g)i. If, on the other hand,
l ∈ N/{P(σ∗(θ),j)∪j} then σ∗
j(θ−l) = σ∗
j(θ) and P(σ∗(θ−l),j) = P(σ∗(θ),j)
in ˆ ΩN−l = hN − l,Θ,(f,g)i. This is because individual l is a successor of
individual j in ˆ Ω = hN,Θ,(f,g)i and according to the deﬁnition of eﬃciency,
individual j’s queue position with respect to all other individuals N/{j,l}
remains unchanged in ˆ ΩN−l = hN − l,Θ,(f,g)i.
The remainder of this section will deal with the question of FB imple-
mentability of the class of separable cost queueing model. The combinatorial
property (or CP) is both necessary and suﬃcient for FB implementability











REMARK 3.4 From condition (2.3) it follows that ˆ Ω satisﬁes CP, if and
only if there exists a unique vector H = {h(1),...,h(n − 1)} such that for
all k ∈ {1,...,n},





(r−1)!(n−r)! f(r). The other observation that fol-







Condition (3.8) will be useful in deriving later results.
PROPOSITION 3.4 ˆ Ω = hN,Θ,(f,g)i is FB implementable if and only
if the cost function satisﬁes CP.
20PROOF:To prove the necessary part of the Proposition we ﬁrst construct
two proﬁles and then apply Lemma 2.1. Let the two states θ and θ0 be of the
following form: θ0
1 > θ0
2 > ... > θ0
n > θ1 > θ2 > ... > θn. Now for all S ⊆ N,
we consider proﬁles θ(S) = (θ1(S),...,θj(S),...,θn(S)) where θj(S) = θj if
j 6∈ S and θj(S) = θ0
j if j ∈ S.
For all S ⊆ N/{1} with proﬁles (θ1,θ−1(S)), σ∗
1(θ1,θ−1(S)) = N − |S|
and for all S ⊆ N/{n} with proﬁles (θ0
n,θ−n(S)), σ∗
n(θ0



























For all xj ∈ {θ2,...,θn,θ0
1,...,θ0
n−1}, if the sets {m1,...,mp}, all subsets
of S/{j}, are such that σ∗
j(xj,θ−j(mq)) = k, for all q ∈ {1,...,p}, then
p P
q=1




Combining all these observations we get
P
S⊆N










Applying Lemma 2.1 and using g(θ1) 6= g(θ0









f(k) = 0 (3.9)
The suﬃciency follows quite easily from Theorem 2.1.
Consider a queueing model ˆ Ω = hN,Θ,(f,g)i. For convenience consider
the “inverse” of the queue σ∗. That is, given θ ∈ Θn, let µ be a permutation
such that θµ(1) ≥ ... ≥ θµ(n). Furthermore, if g(θj) = g(θl) and j < l, then














(r−1)!(n−r)! f(r) for all q ∈ {1,...,n − 1}.
The existence of FB implementable ˆ Ω is already established in Mitra
and Sen (1998) for f(k) = k. The question of the existence of other FB
implementable separable cost queueing models is analysed in the next section.
3.1 Applications
In this section the existence of a fairly large class of FB implementable sepa-
rable cost queueing models is established. We start by deﬁning a broad class
of queueing cost function.
DEFINITION 3.7 ˜ fn−2
a is called a polynomial cost function of degree





apkp, for all k ∈ {1,...,n}.
2. ˜ fn−2
a (k) ≥ ˜ fn−2
a (k − 1), for all k ∈ {2,...,n}.
It is important to observe that the class of polynomial cost depends cru-
cially on the speciﬁcation of the vector a = (a1,...,an−2). Let ˜ Ωn−2
a =
hN,Θ,( ˜ fn−2
a ,g)i be a particular separable cost queueing model with polyno-
mial cost ˜ fn−2
a . Also let ˜ Ωn−2 be the class polynomial cost queueing models.
Observe that from Proposition 3.3 it follows that all polynomial cost queue-
ing models ˜ Ωn−2
a ∈ ˜ Ωn−2 satisfy IP. One can now introduce some special
cases of the class of polynomial cost queueing models. One such special case
is the factorial cost queueing model.
DEFINITION 3.8 f[m] is called a factorial cost function of degree m
if for all m ∈ {1,...n − 2},
f
[m](k) = [k]m = k(k − 1)...(k − m + 1).







(k−m)! if k ≥ m
0 otherwise.
One can easily verify that for all k ∈ {2,...,n},
f
[m](k) − f




Let ˆ Ω[m] = hN,Θ,(f[m],g)i be a separable cost queueing model with factorial
cost of degree m ≤ n − 2.
Another type of polynomial cost queueing model is the standard cost
queueing model.
DEFINITION 3.9 fm is said to be a standard cost function of degree
m if for all m ∈ {1,...n − 2}, fm(k) = km.
One can easily that for all k ∈ {2,...,n},
f
m(k) − f
m(k − 1) = {k
m−1 + k
m−2(k − 1) + ... + (k − 1)
m−1} > 0.
Let ˆ Ωm = hN,Θ,(fm,g)i be a separable cost queueing model with standard
queueing cost fm of degree m ≤ n−2. Notice that f[1] = f1 i.e. factorial cost
function of degree one and standard cost function of degree one are identical.
REMARK 3.5 Following remarks can be made about the polynomial cost
˜ fn−2
a ,
1. By selecting appropriate values of ap for all p = 1,...,n − 2, one can
get factorial cost of any degree m ≤ n−2. For example, with |N| = 4,
a2 = 1 and a1 = −1 we get ˜ f2
a(k) = k2 − k = k(k − 1) = f[2](k). In
general, ˜ fn−2
a is a factorial cost of degree m ≤ n − 2 if ap = s(m,p) for
all p = 1,...,m and ap = 0 otherwise. s(m,p) for all p = 1,...,m, are
Stirling number of the ﬁrst kind11.
11A Stirling number of the ﬁrst kind, s(m,p), is deﬁned as the coeﬃcient of xp in the
expansion of [x]p = x(x−1)...(x−p+1), i.e. [x]p =
m P
p=1
s(m,p)xp. For further references
see Tomescu and Melter (1985).
232. A polynomial cost ˜ fn−2
a is a standard cost of degree m if am = 1 and
ap = 0 for all p 6= m.
THEOREM 3.2 ˜ Ωn−2
a ∈ ˜ Ωn−2 is FB implementable.
We state and prove two Lemma that will be used in proving Theorem
3.2.
LEMMA 3.2 ˆ Ω[m] is FB implementable.
PROOF: To prove this Lemma we will have to show that ˆ Ω[m] satisﬁes CP.



























{(k − m) + m}

















LEMMA 3.3 ˆ Ωm is FB implementable.






where [k]q = k(k − 1)...(k − q + 1) and S(m,q) are Stirling number of the
second kind12.
12A Stirling number of the second kind S(m,q), is deﬁned as the coeﬃcient of [x]q in
the expansion of xq, i.e., xq =
m P
q=0
S(m,q)[x]q. Stirling number of the second kind are such
that S(m,1) = S(m,m) = 1. Moreover, these numbers are unimodal i.e. they satisfy one































= 0 (from Lemma 3.2).
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2: To prove this Theorem we will have to
show that ˜ Ωn−2


































= 0 (from Lemma 3.3).
The remaining part of this section deals with examples of diﬀerent polyno-
mial cost queueing models with |N| = 4. The ﬁrst two examples are factorial
cost queueing models of degree one and two. The third example is a standard
cost queueing model of degree two. The ﬁnal example is a polynomial cost
queueing model of degree two.
EXAMPLE 3.2 Consider ˆ Ω[1] = hN = {1,2,3,4},Θ,(f[1],g)i where the
queueing cost function is of the form f[1](k) = k, for all k = 1,2,3,4.
of the following formulae:
1. 1 = S(m,1) < S(m,2) < ... < S(m,M(m)) > S(m,M(m) − 1)... > S(m,m) = 1
or
2. 1 = S(m,1) < S(m,2) < ... < S(m,M(m)−1) = S(m,M(m)) > ... > S(m,m) =
1
and M(m + 1) = M(m) or M(m + 1) = M(m) + 1 where M(m) = max{q | S(m,q) is
maximum; 1 ≤ q ≤ m}. For a better understanding see Tomescu and Melter (1985).









Now consider a state θ = (θ1,θ2,θ3,θ4) such that θ1 ≥ θ2 ≥ θ3 ≥ θ4. This
means that σ∗










j − 1 if σ∗
j(θ) > σ∗
l (θ).
Consider the Groves transfer, as deﬁned in condition (3.10). Computation
of the transfers give
t1(θ) = −{f[1](2)g(θ2) + f[1](3)g(θ3) + f[1](4)g(θ4)}
+(n − 1){h[1](1)g(θ2) + h[1](2)g(θ3) + h[1](3)g(θ4)}
= −g(θ2) − 1
2g(θ3),
t2(θ) = −{f[1](1)g(θ1) + f[1](3)g(θ3) + f[1](4)g(θ4)}
+(n − 1){h[1](1)g(θ1) + h[1](2)g(θ3) + h[1](3)g(θ4)}
= −1
2g(θ3),
t3(θ) = −{f[1](1)g(θ1) + f[1](2)g(θ2) + f[1](4)g(θ4)}
+(n − 1){h[1](1)g(θ1) + h[1](2)g(θ2) + h[1](3)g(θ4)}
= 1
2g(θ2),
t4(θ) = −{f[1](1)g(θ1) + f[1](2)g(θ2) + f[1](3)g(θ3)}






tj(θ) = 0. To write an explicit form of the transfers for each
state θ ∈ Θ, consider the “inverse” of the order σ∗, suppose µ is a permutation
such that
θµ(1) ≥ θµ(2) ≥ θµ(3) ≥ θµ(4).
The transfers are











The reason why these transfers are incentive compatible is intuitive. The
individuals with ﬁrst and second positions in the queue compensates the
individuals with third and last positions in the queue in such a way that
truth-telling is a dominant strategy for all the individuals. The amount that
the ﬁrst individual pays exceeds the amount paid by the second individual by
g(θµ(2)). So, by moving in the second position the ﬁrst individual with type
θµ(1) cannot beneﬁt because his reduction in payment will be g(θµ(2)) and his
increase in queueing cost will be g(θµ(1))(> g(θµ(2))). Similarly, the individual
having second position in the queue cannot beneﬁt by moving ahead in the
queue. In which case, he will have to pay g(θµ(1)) more and his reduction
in cost will be g(θµ(2))(< g(θµ(1))). One can, by applying similar arguments,
check that these transfers are dominant strategy incentive compatible for all
individuals.
EXAMPLE 3.3 Consider ˆ Ω[2] = hN = {1,2,3,4},Θ,(f[2],g)i where the
queueing cost function is of the form f[2](k) = k(k − 1), for all k = 1,2,3,4.





Elementary computation gives H[2] = {h[2](1) = 0,h[2](2) = 1,h[2](3) = 4}.
Consider a state θ ∈ Θ4 and θµ(1) ≥ θµ(2) ≥ θµ(3) ≥ θµ(4)
13. The transfers
are:
tµ(1)(θ) = −2g(θµ(2)) − 3g(θµ(3)),
tµ(2)(θ) = −3g(θµ(3)),
tµ(3)(θ) = g(θµ(2)) and
tµ(4)(θ) = g(θµ(2)) + 6g(θµ(3)). Adding the transfers give
4 P
k=1
tµ(k)(θ) = 0. By
considering deviations one can ﬁnd that truth-telling is a dominant strategy
13µ is the inverse of σ∗ as deﬁned in the previous example.
27for all individuals.
Observe that the factorial cost of degree 1 is of the same form as the
standard cost of degree 1, i.e. f[1](k) = f1(k) = k. An example of a standard
cost queueing model for |N| = 4 with m = 2 is given below.
EXAMPLE 3.4 Consider ˆ Ω2 = hN = {1,2,3,4},Θ,(f2,g)i where the
queueing cost function is of the form f2(k) = k2, for all k = 1,2,3,4. Observe
that from Proposition 3.3 it follows that
f2(k) = k2 = S(2,1)k + S(2,2)k(k − 1),
where {S(2,2),S(2,1)} are Stirling numbers of the second kind satisfying
S(2,1) = S(2,2) = 114.





By substituting the factorial cost representation as explained above we ob-
serve that
h2(r) = h[1](r) + h[2](r). Thus, H2 = {h2(1) = 1
3,h2(2) = 11
6 ,h2(3) = 16
3 }.
For a state θ ∈ Θ4 with θµ(1) ≥ θµ(2) ≥ θµ(3) ≥ θµ(4), the explicit form of the
transfers are:







2g(θµ(2)) + 7g(θµ(3)). Check that
4 P
k=1
tµ(k)(θ) = 0. With these
transfers it is clear that the individuals getting ﬁrst and second positions
in the queue compensate the individuals getting third and fourth positions
in the queue in such a way that truth-telling is a dominant strategy for all
individuals.
14For m = 3, f3(k) = k3 = S(3,1)k + S(3,2)k(k − 1) + S(3,3)k(k − 1)(k − 2) where
S(3,1) = S(3,3) = 1 and S(3,2) = 3. For other ms’ one can similarly represent standard
cost as a weighted sum of factorial costs of degrees {1,...,m} where the weights are
Stirling numbers of the second kind.
28EXAMPLE 3.5 Consider ˜ Ω2
a = hN = {1,2,3,4},Θ,( ˜ f2
a,g)i where the
queueing cost function is of the form ˜ f2




= a1f1(k) + a2f2(k)
= a1f[1](k) + a2{S(2,1)f[1](k) + S(2,2)f[2](k)}
= {a1 + a2}f[1](k) + a2f[2](k).








By substituting the factorial cost representation it is quite easy to observe
that ˜ h2
a(k) = {a1 + a2}h[1](k) + a2h[2](k) for all k = 1,2,3.
Thus ˜ H2
a = {˜ h2
a(1) = 1







Consider a state θ ∈ Θ4 and θµ(1) ≥ θµ(2) ≥ θµ(3) ≥ θµ(4). Here the transfers
are:





2(a1 + 3a2)g(θµ(2)) and
tµ(4)(θ) = 1
2(a1 + 3a2)g(θµ(2)) + (a1 + 7a2)g(θµ(3)).




The analysis of the class of separable cost queueing models in this section
suggests the existence of a fairly large class of FB implementable separable
15Note that ˜ Ω2
a = hN = {1,2,3,4},Θ,( ˜ f2
a,g)i is a polynomial cost queueing model if
˜ f2
a(k + 1) − ˜ f2
a(k) ≥ 0 for all k = 1,2,3. Therefore one of the following conditions must
satisﬁed.
1. a1 < 0 ⇒ a1 + 3a2 ≥ 0
2. a1 = 0 ⇒ a2 ≥ 0 and
3. a1 > 0 ⇒ a1 + 7a2 ≥ 0.
29cost queueing models. This FB implementable class increases with the num-
ber of individuals. For example, factorial cost and standard cost queueing
models are of degree m ≤ n−2. The class of polynomial cost queueing model
are also of degree n − 2. So degree of n − 2 plays an important role in FB
implementability of queueing models. This is because CP requires that the
(n−1)th order diﬀerence at queue position 1 must be zero. Thus polynomial
costs of degree more than n − 2 are not FB implementable.
4 A General Class
A more general class of queueing models that are FB implementable is con-
sidered in this section. This class is deﬁned by the following property.
DEFINITION 4.10 Ω satisﬁes Property G if for all j ∈ N and for all




fp(k)gp(θj)+βj(θj) for all j ∈ N, for all k ∈ {1,...,n}, for
all θj ∈ Θ and for all p ∈ {1,...,M}.
2. For all p ∈ {1,...,M}, gp(θj) > 0 for all θj ∈ Θ and gp(θj) is continuous
and strictly increasing in θj.









Let ΩG be the class of queueing models satisfying Property G. Observe that
a queueing model ΩG ∈ ΩG with M = 1 and βj(θj) = 0 for all θj ∈ Θ
and for all j ∈ N, is a ﬁrst best implementable separable cost queueing
model. In the next result it is proved that this class of queueing models is
FB implementable.
THEOREM 4.3 ΩG ∈ ΩG is FB implementable.
30PROOF: To prove this Theorem we ﬁrst argue that ΩG ∈ ΩG satisﬁes IP.
This follows from the fact that the eﬃcient queue in any ΩG ∈ ΩG depends
on the ordering of the types as was the case for separable cost queueing
models. Hence by following same arguments as in Proposition 3.3, one can
prove that ΩG ∈ ΩG satisﬁes IP.
The next step is to specify a Groves transfer and show that ΩG ∈ ΩG








fp(k) = 0 implies from condition (3.7) that for all p ∈
{1,...,M}, there exists a unique vector Hp = {hp(1),...,hp(n − 1)} such
that for all k ∈ {1,...,n}, fp(k) = (n − k)hp(k) + (k − 1)hp(k − 1). Given
ΩG ∈ ΩG satisfy IP, by following the suﬃciency argument in Proposition























































= (n − 1)C(θ).






ˆ γj(θ−j) = 0.
One can easily verify the following results:
• ΩG ∈ ΩG satisﬁes CP.
31• The class of FB implementable separable cost queueing models is a
special case of ΩG.
5 A Discounted Cost Model
In all the previous sections, the queueing models that were considered had
a cost speciﬁcation that was increasing over time. Discounting is another
standard way of evaluating costs or beneﬁts which accrue over time. For
example, in repeated games, one way to analyse beneﬁts of an individual
over time is to study the discounted payoﬀ of the individual. Similarly, in
some bargaining models, the cost of delay is measured in terms of a constant
discount rate. One can think of many other situations where discounting is
a standard way of measuring the cost of delay. Therefore, another way of
specifying costs in a queueing model is to consider a decrease in gross beneﬁt
from the service over time. The general model speciﬁed in section two is
general enough to include this model as a special case in the following way.
DEFINITION 5.11 A queueing model Ωd = hN,[0,1]i is called a dis-
counted cost model if for all j ∈ N and for all k ∈ {1,...,n}, θj(k) =
(1 − θk
j)vj where θj ∈ [0,1].
The utility of an individual j in Ωd is of the form Uj(k,tj;θj) = θk
jvj+tj. This
form of the utility is obtained by substituting θj(k) = (1−θk
j)vj in the general
queueing model. Here θj ∈ [0,1] represents the type of individual j which is
private information. One can check that θj(k +1)−θj(k) = θk
j(1−θj)vj ≥ 0
for all k ∈ {1,...,n − 1}.
It is quite easy to observe that for Ωd, the domain speciﬁed satisﬁes
Holmstr¨ om’s deﬁnition of “convex domains” and hence can be implemented
only by Groves mechanism. For discounted cost queueing models, CP means
that for all j ∈ N, θj(1 − θj)n = 0 i.e. θj ∈ {0,1}. Thus for all θj ∈ (0,1)
and for all j ∈ N, CP is not satisﬁed. The next Proposition looks at the
question of FB implementability of Ωd.
32PROPOSITION 5.5 Ωd = hN,[0,1]i is not FB implementable.
PROOF: To prove this Proposition we will consider two states and apply
Lemma 2.1. Consider a particular individual m ∈ N such that vm ≤ vj for
all j ∈ N/{m}. Let θm = 1
3, θj = 1
2 for all j ∈ N/{m} and ¯ θj = 0 for all
j ∈ N. Consider two states θ = (θ1,...,θn) and ¯ θ = (¯ θ1,..., ¯ θn). Elementary
calculation yields θk
m(1 − θm)vm < θk
j(1 − θj)vj for all k ∈ {1,...,n} and for
all j ∈ N/{m}. Therefore, n = σ∗
m(θ) > σ∗
j(θ) for all j ∈ N/{m}. Now for
all S ⊆ N, we consider proﬁles θ(S) = (θ1(S),...,θj(S),...,θn(S)) where
θj(S) = θj if j 6∈ S and θj(S) = ¯ θj = 0 if j ∈ S. For all S ⊆ N/{m} with
proﬁles (θm,θ−m(S)), σ∗













For all xj ∈ {θ2,...,θn}/{θm}, if the sets {m1,...,mp}, all subsets of
S ⊆ N/{j}, are such that σ∗
j(xj,θ−j(mq)) = k, for all q ∈ {1,...,p}, then
p P
q=1



















= θm(θm − 1)n = 1
3(1
3 − 1)n 6= 0.
From the constructions in the previous Proposition it is easy to see that
if θ is such that θj ∈ {0,1} for all j ∈ N, then Ωd is FB implementable.
Therefore discounted cost queueing model cannot be FB implemented simply
because it fails to satisfy CP. This result conﬁrms the importance of CP as
a necessary condition for FB implementability of any queueing model.
336 Individual Rationality
This section deals with the identiﬁcation of the sub-class of individually ratio-
nal queueing models within the class of FB implementable queueing models
discussed earlier.
DEFINITION 6.12 A mechanism M ≡ hσ,ti is individually rational
for a decision problem Ω, if for all j ∈ N and for all θ ∈ ΘN,
Uj(dj(θ),tj(θ),θj) ≥ 0
This deﬁnition means that each individual has an outside option inde-
pendent of his valuation which gives him a utility of zero. An individual will
refuse to participate in the mechanism if he does not get an ex-post utility
of at least zero.
A queueing problem is said to be FB
∗ implementable if it is FB imple-
mentable by a mechanism which satisﬁes individual rationality.
PROPOSITION 6.6 Ω = hN, ¯ Θi satisfying CP and IP is not FB
∗ imple-
mentable.
PROOF: Consider a state θ satisfying CP and IP such that θj(1) > vj for
all j ∈ N. Clearly,
Uj(σ
∗
j(θ),tj(θ),θj) − tj(θ) = vj − θj(σ
∗
j(θ)) < 0
for all j ∈ N. Balancedness imply
P
j∈N
tj(θ) = 0. If tj(θ) < 0 for some
j ∈ S ⊂ N then Uj(σ∗
j(θ),tj(θ),θj) < 0 for all j ∈ S and hence individual
rationality is not satisﬁed. So for all j ∈ N, tj(θ) ≥ 0. Therefore, for
balancedness we need tj(θ) = 0 for all j ∈ N. If tj(θ) = 0 for all j ∈ N
then Uj(σ∗
j(θ),tj(θ),θj) < 0 for all j ∈ N. Thus Ω = hN, ¯ Θi is not FB
∗
implementable.
The general queueing model is not FB
∗ implementable simply because
the cost of an individual can be so high as to exceed his beneﬁt from the
34service. However, for ΩG ∈ ΩG and separable cost queueing models where
an individual’s cost parameter θj belongs to an interval Θ ≡ [θ,θ], one can
ﬁnd suﬃcient condition under which FB
∗ implementability can be achieved.
To establish this result for ΩG ∈ ΩG, consider ¯ βj ≥ βj(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ ≡ [θ,θ]
and for all j ∈ N. Let ¯ β ≥ ¯ βj and let v ≤ vj for all j ∈ N.













p(r)} + ¯ β,
then it is FB
∗ implementable.
PROOF: Consider ΩG ∈ ΩG and also the Groves mechanism M with the
Groves transfer obtained from condition (4.12). Further we take an individual




























































fp(r) − ¯ β
≥ v − [
M P
p=1




fp(r) + ¯ β]
≥ 0.
A similar result follows for the ﬁrst best implementable separable cost
queueing model.
35Corollary 6.1 If a FB implementable ˆ Ω = hN,Θ,(f,g)i satisﬁes







then it is FB
∗ implementable.
The prove of this corollary is immediate from the fact that a ﬁrst best imple-
mentable separable cost queueing model is a special case of ΩG with M = 1
and βj(θ) = 0 for all θj ∈ Θ and for all j ∈ N.
From this section one can conclude that with a very general cost structure
one cannot FB
∗ implement the queueing model. However, for the separable
cost queueing models and general FB implementable class of queueing models
one can ﬁnd lower bounds on the beneﬁt, suﬃcient for FB
∗ implementability.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides a complete characterization of FB implementability of
queueing models. For a queueing model to be ﬁrst best implementable, it
is necessary and suﬃcient that the type vector of each individual satisﬁes a
certain combinatorial property called CP and that the externality that can
be imposed by an individual on the remaining set of individuals satisﬁes
the independence property. The class of queueing models analysed in this
paper are implementable only by Groves mechanism. Therefore, the ﬁrst best
implementability of a queueing problem reduces to the problem of ﬁnding
appropriate balanced Groves mechanism. The independence property allows
for a particular type of separability which matches the separability obtained
from the combinatorial property. This paper identiﬁes a fairly large class of
ﬁrst best implementable queueing models. For completeness, the question of
individual rationality of the FB implementable queueing models is analysed
in section six. The broad conclusion from this analysis is that if the beneﬁt
derived by each individual from the service is suﬃciently high, then a FB
implementable queueing model satisﬁes individual rationality.
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